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Abstract
The software protection strategy of software developer and the inherent risk to end user in
using pirated software are two major factors that affect a user’s decision on whether to
purchase or pirate a software product. This paper analyzes the optimal protection strategy
for software developer in horizontally and vertically differentiated markets. We find that the
implementation cost of software protection constitutes the primary factor for software
developers to determine their software protection strategies. However, in a vertically
differentiated market, the lower quality product should always adopt a non-protection
strategy, regardless of the protection implementation cost. In other cases, protection would
only be optimal if the protection implementation cost to the software developer is relatively
small. These findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence.
Keywords: Software piracy, software protection strategy, horizontal differentiation,
vertical differentiation
1.

Introduction
According to a global report by Business Software Alliance (2003), the software
industry is said to have lost more than $13.08 billion in business during the year 2002 due to
software piracy. It remains to be one of the most well known and persistent problems of the
IT industry. It is estimated that an average of 39% of all software installed in 2002 were
pirated versions (Business Software Alliance 2003). In fact, the situation is deteriorating with
the rapid and pervasive application of IT in the modern society.
At the first glance, one may perceive software piracy as just another example of the
illegal duplication of other intellectual properties like books, journals, or media contents.
However, there are at least two factors that make software piracy a unique type of problem in
itself. Firstly, software developers are able to implement protection codes or mechanisms
that can effectively and significantly increase the difficulty to pirate. Such measures are
usually not available to publishers and producers. The protection of software products can
range from the use of hardware “dongles” to just requiring the user to enter a cryptic product
key code. Although one may argue that these schemes are usually not unbreakable, they
increase the cost for pirates to use illegal copies of software. Of course, the software
developer would also need to pay a certain implementation cost for this type of software
protection mechanisms. Secondly, there are inherent risks in using pirated software. These
risks are unique to the software industry and make software piracy quite different from other
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forms of illegal duplication of intellectual properties. For instance, due to the unlawful nature
of piracy, the quality of pirated software can never be guaranteed. Very often the pirated
software would have already been infected with malicious computer virus before it arrives at
the hands of the end user.
Also, software is seldom free of defects. Some defects not only result in
malfunctioning of the software but also leave “vulnerabilities” for malicious computer
hackers to exploit. Very often these defects would only be discovered after the consumer has
purchased and used the software for a certain period of time. It is a common practice for
software developers to provide post-sale technical support to the legitimate users should there
be any subsequent problems. While these types of technical support may exist in a variety of
forms, ranging from security patches, features updates, to email or even telephone support,
they are usually available only to the paying consumers but not to the pirates. Users of
pirated software are at their own risk. It is reasonable to assume that some people would be
deterred from pirating in view of this risk.
Cheng et al (1997) attempted to exhaustively enlist the reasons behind people’s
software purchasing or pirating decisions in an empirical study. In particular, they found
“technical support in case of problems” as well as “worry about computer viruses” to be
among the ten most important reasons for people to purchase, rather than pirate software.
In the Internet age, the risk of using vulnerable software cannot be overemphasized.
The US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database (US-CERT 2004) lists many popular software
products that contain critical security vulnerabilities. For example, the various “buffer
overrun” vulnerabilities that exist in the popular Oracle 9i product would require software
updates available only to registered users. In principle, users of pirated copies of Oracle 9i
would have to bear the risk of future attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities, especially if
their systems are connected to the Internet. The risk in using pirated software became quite
apparent in the recent “Blaster” attack. “Blaster” was an Internet virus that exploited a
known vulnerability of the Windows XP software. A timely patch to this vulnerability was
actually released by the vendor but was made available only to registered customers. As a
result, machines running pirated copies of Windows XP were forced to disconnect from the
Internet to prevent from getting exposed to the virus attack.
To summarize, both the software protection mechanism and the risk in using pirated
software serve to reduce piracy. The former is mainly a preventive measure that is available
to the software developer who needs to weigh the cost and benefit before deciding on what
type of protection mechanism, if any, should be adopted. The latter can be considered a
deterrent means that is beyond the control of any single party. The effect of risk may depend
on a number of factors such as the chance of virus infection through the use of pirated
software, the ultimate reliability of the software product 3, etc. In this paper, we attempt to
study the optimal protection strategies for software firms in a duopoly software market, with
the explicit consideration of the potential risk in using pirated software due to the lack of
technical support. We develop an analytic model that assumes that people can overcome the
software protection by bearing a cost of pirating. Users are heterogeneous in the cost of
pirating. We will also model the risk in using pirated software in our framework.
We consider a duopoly market under two forms of product differentiation: horizontal
and vertical (Tirole 1988). By horizontal differentiation, we mean that software firms
compete with each other by designing features that are unique from its competitor. On the
3

In this study, we assume that software developers would not intentionally reduce the reliability of their software products

for the purpose of deterring piracy.
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other hand, in a vertically differentiated market, firms compete in the quality of their products.
Our main objective is to analyze the optimal protection strategies for software firms under
each situation. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: To begin with, we will examine
the relevant prior research in the area of software piracy first. We will then develop an
analytical model conforming to our observations mentioned above. In particular, we will
analyze the problem using two well known market competition paradigms, namely the
horizontally differentiated market and the vertically differentiated one.
2.

Background Literature
Intuitively thinking, the existence of piracy should reduce demand and thus profit. It
follows that the best strategy for software firms would be to increase the protection level as
much as possible so that potential pirates would simply find it very costly to pirate. However,
Conner & Rumelt (1991) argue that by taking into account the effect of network externalities,
as commonly found in software products, a high level of protection may not be optimal for
firms. They show that in a monopoly setting, raising software protection would be profitmaximizing only when there is only insignificant effect of network externalities. Otherwise,
profit would decrease with an increased protection level because some would-be pirates are
forced to do without the software, rather than buying it. However, the model used does not
consider strategic interactions in a competitive market as well as the inherent risk in using
pirated software.
The work by Shy & Thisse (1999) further develops the analysis of optimal software
protection strategy by the use of a horizontally differentiated duopoly model. Their findings
are similar to those by Conner & Rumelt in that when externalities effects are strong, nonprotection would be optimal for competing software firms. Their model assumes
dichotomization in two dimensions. Firstly, consumers are dichotomized into supportoriented or support-independent ones. Support-oriented users choose to buy rather than
pirate if the price of software is less than the utility they derive from the support service.
Secondly, rather than treating the level of protection level as a continuous variable, firm’s
protection strategies are dichotomized into either full protection or nil protection. This
conforms to the reality in that software products usually come only with a simple protection
mechanism that checks for a valid product key, or are just completely unprotected.
However, their model also assumes that end users would have no way to use pirated
software if software protection is in place. Unfortunately this is often not true in real life. In
fact, end users can usually obtain pirated software with protection mechanism already
compromised. Also, most of the time software is only protected by a product key code that
can be easily duplicated. Therefore, we believe that it should be more realistic to assume that
people can still pirate even though a software product is protected, only that they would need
to pay a cost of pirating. The cost for pirating can differ by individual but in general should
be small compared with the price of software.
The dichotomization of support-oriented and support-independent consumers does not
fully represent the inherent risk in using pirated software as discussed previously. In Shy &
Thisse’s model, technical support only brings a fixed amount of utility to support-oriented
users. However, we believe the lack of technical support would introduce a risk that
essentially discounts, in the sense of expected utility, the benefits derivable from using the
pirated software.
The concept of risk in using pirated software was first used by Banerjee (2003) in his
analysis of the software piracy problem from the perspective of social welfare and
government policy. In his model, end user simply cannot be certain that a piece of software
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obtained from illegal sources would indeed work as expected. However, his focus was
mainly on governmental monitoring of counterfeiting business.
We believe that the concept of risk is not only applicable to cases when end user
purchase software from pirates, but also to cases when end users make illegal copies of
licensed software themselves. In fact, as pointed out earlier, the study by Cheng et al (1997)
reveals that there are other risks in using pirated software, such as the lack of technical
support in case of problems and computer viruses. In the following, market competition,
dichotomization of software protection level, as well as the risk in using pirated software will
be incorporated into our analytical model.
3.

Horizontal Differentiation
We start with the horizontally differentiated market setting. Namely, we consider the
case when competing software firms aim at the same application area (e.g. symbolic
computation, graphics design, web authoring, etc.) but produce software with features
differentiated from each other. Moreover, each consumer would value each of these
differentiated features differently.
For example, consider the desktop operating systems provided by Apple Computer
and that by Microsoft. Both operating systems are designed to provide an easy-to-use
graphical user interface for end users to manage their personal computers. However, some of
the features they provide are unique from each other and these differentiated features are
valued differently by different camps of consumers.
For simplicity, we model the market as a duopoly and represent the heterogeneity in
consumers’ preferences for the two different software products using the “linear city” model
(Hotelling 1929). In the real software market, very often there would be an innovator firm at
the beginning, followed by a number of other software developers who believe it would be
profitable to sell similar products in the same application area. However, due to fierce
market competition among software developers, usually only a few major players might
remain when the market becomes stable. Such a phenomenon of market consolidation can be
found in many application areas such as productivity tools, graphics packages, etc. We thus
believe that our duopoly model represents an acceptable approximation of reality. We denote
the two competing products software 1 (sw1) and software 2 (sw2) respectively.
3.1.

The Firms
Before the software is actually developed, the firm would decide on whether to
implement any protection mechanism against unauthorized copying. As discussed earlier, a
dichotomization of protection strategy should be more appropriate than a continuous level of
protection because software products nowadays are usually shipped with protection by simple
checking of product key code, or without any protection at all. We denote their decisions on
protection strategies by ηi ∈ {0,1} ( i = 1, 2 ) where ηi = 0 means firm i has chosen not to
implement protection. However, if a firm chooses to implement protection ( ηi = 1 ), an
implementation cost k would be incurred.
Once the firms decide on their protection strategies, they also need to decide the
selling price of their software pi ( i = 1, 2 ). It is assumed that firms would act rationally and
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choose their respective optimal prices to maximize their own profits. Assuming a zero
marginal cost of production for simplicity, the profit of a firm is given by:

π i = pi di − kηi

….. (1)

where di denotes the demand of the software in concern. In order to determine the optimal
price, a firm needs to anticipate the possible reactions of both its competitor and the potential
consumers, as detailed in the following.
3.2.

The Consumers
We will assume full participation by consumers in that all consumers either buy or
pirate one of the software. There are two main factors, namely benefit and cost, affecting the
utility a consumer may derive from using a piece of software:
Benefit
The benefit of software would depend on the intrinsic quality of it as well as
how its features match the preferences of the user. A piece of software that is highly
regarded by one user may not appear to be that useful to another. In our model for
horizontally differentiated market, the intrinsic software quality is assumed to be the same for

both firms and is denoted by q .

On the other hand, consumers are ranked by their

preferences of sw1 to sw2, with their relative preference positions denoted by x ∈ [0,1] .
Namely, a consumer with a smaller x would prefer sw1 more to sw2. Considering the
deterioration in benefit due to preference mismatch, we model the benefit of sw1 to a
consumer at position x by q − tx where t denotes the benefit degradation factor (i.e. the
“transportation cost”) due to preference mismatch. Similarly, the benefit of sw2 would be
q − t (1 − x) to the same consumer.
Cost

The cost would simply be the selling price of the software in case a consumer

purchases it. Prices are denoted by p1 and p2 for sw1 and sw2 respectively. In the case of
pirating protected software, a cost for pirating would also be incurred. It is assumed that this
cost would depend on individual’s characteristics (e.g. technical know-how, available
resources for pirating, etc.) but would be more or less similar across different target software
to be pirated. As such, the consumer’s cost for pirating is modeled to be heterogeneous
among consumers but the same for both sw1 and sw2. For simplicity, we define the cost for
pirating as τ z where τ is the homogeneous scaling factor of piracy costs while z ∈ [0,1]
denotes the consumer’s heterogeneity in pirating protected software. Essentially, some
consumers pay a higher cost than others to pirate a piece of protected software.
As a result, the utility U b1 and U b 2 derived from purchasing sw1 and sw2 would be:
U b1 = q − tx − p1

….. (2)

U b 2 = q − t (1 − x) − p2

….. (3)
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As mentioned before, users of pirated software are all subject to risk. We may express this
risk factor by the expected benefit of using a pirated software copy. Assuming a risk factor of

φ ∈ (0,1) , the utility U p1 and U p 2 for pirating sw1 and sw2 would respectively be:
U p1 = (1 − φ )(q − tx) − τ zη1

….. (4)

U p 2 = (1 − φ )(q − t (1 − x)) − τ zη2

….. (5)

Namely, 1 − φ is the probability that the pirated software would work perfectly.
3.3.

The Market
Having introduced the essential characteristics of software firms and consumers, we
are about to incorporate the two in a competitive market. Namely, we consider a competitive
market in a three-stage non-cooperative game. In stage 1, software firms set their respective

protection strategies (η1 ,η 2 ) . In stage 2, firms determine their optimal prices ( p1 , p2 ) with
the expectation that their profits would be maximized. Lastly in stage 3, consumers choose
whether to buy or pirate either one of the software so as to maximize their utilities. The game,
in its extensive form, can be illustrated in Figure 1.
We will study the problem using the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
concept. That is, both firms would first anticipate the utility-maximizing decisions of
consumers that would happen at stage 3. Based on this anticipation and also considering the
profit-maximizing behavior of its competitor, a firm determines its profit-maximizing price
under the 4 possible protection strategies, namely (η1 = 1,η2 = 1) , (η1 = 1,η 2 = 0) ,
(η1 = 0,η 2 = 1) and (η1 = 0,η 2 = 0) . Lastly, by comparing the maximized profits at each
different protection strategy, the two firms set their optimal protection strategies at stage 1
based on the Nash Equilibrium concept. Before proceeding with the analysis, the utility
function of the consumer is restated as follows:
if buy sw1
⎧ q − tx − p1
⎪ (1 − φ )(q − tx) − τ zη1
if pirate sw1
U =⎨
….. (6)
q − t (1 − x) − p2
if buy sw2
⎪ (1 − φ )(q − t (1 − x)) − τ zη
if pirate sw2
2
⎩
while the profit functions of the two firms are given by:

π 1 = p1d1 − kη1
π 2 = p2 d 2 − kη2

….. (7)

127

The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006)

Stage 1:
To
protect or
not?

(1,1)

(0,0)
(1,0)

Stage 2:
What
price?

(p1, p2 )

(0,1)

(p1, p2 )

(p1, p2 )

(p1, p2 )

Stage 3:
Buy or
pirate
Buy sw1

Buy sw2

Pirate sw1

Pirate sw2

Buy sw1

Buy sw2

Pirate sw1

Pirate sw2

Buy sw1

Buy sw2

Pirate sw1

Pirate sw2

Buy sw1

Buy sw2

Pirate sw1

Pirate sw2

Figure 1: Game Tree

One may easily note from (6) and (7) the dynamics of such a market. Firstly, by
setting protection level and price, a firm is affecting the decisions of consumers on whether to
buy or pirate sw1 or sw2. Such decisions would in turn affect the demands for sw1 and sw2.
Finally, the profits of firms are actually determined by the demands for their software, as can
be seen from (7). To continue our analysis, we will first study the demands for sw1 and sw2
that result from the utility-maximizing behavior of consumers.
3.4.

Demand and Profit at Equilibrium
We will consider the demand of sw1 first. To start with, let us focus on the effect of
x on the consumer’s utility and leave the effect of z alone for the time being. Figure 2
shows the utility functions for purchasing and for pirating sw1 at each fixed value of z .
Firstly, all utility functions of the consumer are linear in x . For sw1, the utilities of the two
choices (i.e. buying or pirating) would simply be represented by the two downward-sloping

straight lines U b1 and U p1 . In particular, the slope for buying is −t whereas that for pirating
is −(1 − φ )t . As φ must be within the interval (0,1) , U b1 would always be steeper than U p1 .
From Figure 2, it can be easily seen that consumers in the range (0, xb1 p1 ) would prefer
buying to pirating sw1 while those in the range ( xb1 p1 ,1) would prefer pirating to buying.
We can now consider the effect of z on the demand. It can be seen from (6) that
different values of z would result in different intercepts of the pirating utility, as shown in
Figure 3.
Note that the intersection point xb1 p1 would also be changing with z . Considering z ,
the indifference point xb1 p1 becomes a line of indifference between buying and pirating sw1.
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The consumer’s utility functions U b1 and U p1 become 2-dimensional planes in the 3dimensional space of (U , x, z ) . The demand for sw1 is simply the projection, on the ( x, z )
plane, of the region where the plane U b1 is the highest. Essentially this area is outlined by the
indifference line xb1 p1 with respect to z within the interval z ∈ [0,1] .

U

U

Up1 (z=0)
Up1
Up1 (z=1)
Ub1
0

xb1p1

1

x

Ub1
0

Figure 2: Utilities of Buying and Pirating sw1

xb1p1 (z=0)

xb1p1 (z=1)

1

x

Figure 3: Effect of z on demand

More generally, we can derive the utility-maximizing demands for software from the
appropriate lines of indifference, as will be shown later. It should be noted that U b1 and U p1
may not necessarily intersect within the interval of x = (0,1) . This could happen when the
vertical intercept of U p1 is larger than that of U b1 , and in this case pirating would always
undercut buying. We would not further analyze this case because the firm will doubtlessly
need to lower its price or abandon the market as no consumer is buying the product. On the
other hand, U b1 and U p1 would also not intersect when the value of U p1 is smaller than that
of U b1 when x = 1 . In this case, buying would always undercut pirating. Again, we would
not further analyze this case because there is actually no issue of piracy under such a situation.
We may now consider the situation when sw2 is also put in the picture. Considering
the 2-dimensional space of (U , x) , the utility functions U b 2 and U p 2 would simply be two
lines having slopes t and (1 − φ )t respectively, as shown in Figure 4.

129

The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006)

We are only interested in the situation when there are non-zero portions of users
buying and pirating sw1 or sw2. This is equivalent to the following assumption that posits the
relations among the intersecting points:
1>xb 2 p 2 > x p1 p 2 > xb1 p1 > 0 ∀ z ∈ [0,1]

….. (C1)

Now we can consider the 3-dimensional space of (U , x, z ) . As explained previously,
the demands for sw1 and sw2 can be derived from the indifference lines xb1 p1 and xb 2 p 2 . In
other words, the demands would simply be the projections on the ( x, z ) plane as shown in
Figure 5. Based on the utility functions of the consumer as given by (6), the demands for sw1
and sw2 are:
1

d1 = ∫ xb1 p1dz =
0

1 τη1 − 2 p1 + 2qφ
2
tφ

1

d 2 = 1 − ∫ xb 2 p 2 dz = 1 +
0

….. (8)

1 τη2 − 2 p2 + 2qφ − 2tφ
2
tφ

….. (9)

U

z

xb1p1 xp1p2

xb2p2

1

Ub2
Up2

d2
d1

Up1
Ub1
0

xb1p1

xp1p2

xb2p2

1

x

0

Figure 4: Utilities of Buying and Pirating

1

x

Figure 5: Demand

That is, the utility-maximizing demands are now entirely in terms of other model parameters,
namely the exogenous q , φ , t and τ as well as the endogenous p1 , p2 , η1 and η2 .
Similarly, by substituting the anticipated second-stage demands into (7), the firms’ profit
functions π 1 and π 2 can be expressed entirely in terms of the exogenous q , φ , t , τ and k
as well as the endogenous p1 , p2 , η1 and η2 .
Since firms need to determine optimal prices to maximize their profits, their problems
would be:
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max
max
max ⎛ 1 τη1 − 2 p1 + 2qφ ⎞
π1 =
p1d1 − kη1 =
⎟ p1 − kη1
p1
p1
p1 ⎜⎝ 2
tφ
⎠

….. (10)

max
max
max ⎛ 1 τη2 − 2 p2 + 2qφ − 2tφ ⎞
1+
π2 =
p2 d 2 − kη 2 =
⎟ p2 − kη2
p2
p2
p2 ⎜⎝ 2
tφ
⎠

….. (11)

Proposition 1 4: In a horizontally differentiated software market, protection would be
optimal for both firms only if k < k * =

τ (τ + 4qφ )
. Otherwise, non-protection would be
16tφ

optimal for both firms.

Note that k * is increasing in τ , the pirating cost. Protection would be optimal only if
the protection cost is below k * which mainly consists of a square term of the pirating cost τ
of the consumer. This suggests that firms should prefer only a very simple and low-cost
protection mechanism or no protection at all.
As shown in the Appendix, the optimal prices, demands and profits of both firms
should be symmetrical if they adopt the same protection strategy. In case of protection, the
optimal price, demand and profit should be p1* = p2* =

τ + 2qφ
4

, d1* = d 2* =

τ + 2qφ
and
4tφ

τ 2 + 4τ qφ + 4q 2φ 2 − 16ktφ
respectively. In case of non-protection, the optimal
π =π =
16tφ
*
1

*
2

qφ
q
q 2φ
*
*
*
*
, d1 = d 2 =
and π 1 = π 2 =
price, demand and profit would be p = p =
2
2t
4t
*
1

*
2

respectively.
It follows that the optimal profit is increasing in q but decreasing in t , regardless of
whether protection is in place or not. Namely, optimal profit increases when software is of
higher quality but decreases when the negative effect of preference mismatch (i.e. the
transportation cost) is high. Also, when protection is in place, the optimal profit is also
increasing in τ , the pirating cost on the consumer side. These very much conform to
intuition.
Comparing the optimal prices and demands for protection and non-protection, it can
be seen that the optimal prices and demands for non-protection would always be lower than
those for protection. In this sense, the protection cost contributes as the major determining
factor for firms to adopt protection. On the other hand, the effects of risk (i.e. φ ) on the
optimal price, demand as well as profit are summarized in the following table of comparative
statics:

4

Proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward and withheld due to length limitation. Interested readers may obtain it from the

authors directly.
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∂p1*
∂φ
+
+

Both Protect
Both Not Protect

∂p2*
∂φ
+
+

∂d1*
∂φ

−
0

∂d 2*
∂φ
−
0

∂π 1*
∂φ
+′
+

∂π 2*
∂φ
+′
+

+′: positive if τ < 2qφ

In general, optimal prices and profits should increase with risk 5. It is also interesting to note
that the optimal demands would decrease with risk in case of protection. The intuition behind
is that if the software is protected and the risk becomes higher, the firm can charge a higher
price and reap a higher profit, although there are actually less buying consumers.
4.

Vertical Differentiation
Having considered the case of horizontally differentiated market, we now consider the
case when software products are vertically differentiated. By vertical differentiation, we
mean that software products compete in quality. In general, the higher quality firm can sell at
a higher price and also the preference for quality is assumed to be different across different
consumers.
Vertical differentiation is indeed quite common in the software industry. Many
popular software magazines and download sites (e.g. PC Magazine, Bytes, download.com,
zdnet.com, etc.) offer ratings of software products in terms of a common set of criteria such
as ease-of-use, functionalities, etc. to assist consumers in making their purchasing decisions.
The main difference from the analysis of horizontal differentiation would be in the
formulation of the consumer’s utility functions. Namely, we denote the intrinsic qualities of
sw1 and sw2 by q1 and q2 respectively. Consumers are now ranked by their preferences to

the quality of software, denoted by θ ∈ (0,1) , instead of by their preferences of product
features (i.e. x ). A consumer with a larger θ would derive more utility from the quality of
sw1 and sw2. As such, the benefits of sw1 and sw2 to a consumer θ would be q1θ and q2θ

respectively. Without loss of generosity, we assume q1 > q2 . Therefore, the utility functions
of the consumer are modified as follows:
if buy sw1
⎧ q1θ − p1
⎪ (1 − φ )q1θ − τ zη1 if pirate sw1
U =⎨
if buy sw2
qθ−p
⎪(12− φ )q 2θ − τ zη
if pirate sw2
2
2
⎩

….. (12)

where the definitions of p1 , p2 ,τ , z ,η1 ,η 2 remain the same as in horizontal differentiation.

5

The condition τ

< 2qφ

is likely to be valid because the pirating cost should be significantly lower than the benefit of the

software to make a case of software piracy.
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U

Ub1
Ub2
Up1
Up2

1

0 or

z

θp1b2

θb1b2

d2

τz
-p2

d1

-p1

0

θp1p2 θp2b2 θp1b2

θb1b2

1 θ

Figure 6: Consumer’s Utility

1θ

0
Figure 7: Demands

Consider the consumer’s utility when pirating either sw1 or sw2. From (12), it follows that the
slope of consumer’s utility with respect to θ when pirating sw1 would always be steeper than
that of pirating sw2. It can be easily seen that when (η1 ,η 2 ) is either (1,1) , (0,1) or (0, 0) ,
pirating sw1 would always dominate pirating sw2. When (η1 ,η2 ) = (1, 0) , pirating sw2 may
dominate pirating sw1 for some consumers. Denote the point of indifference between pirating
sw1 and sw2 as θ p1 p 2 , it can be seen that no one would pirate sw2 unless θ p1 p 2 > 0 .

Now consider the consumer’s utility when buying either software. From (12), it is
clear that the slope of consumer’s utility with respect to θ when buying sw1 would always be
steeper than that of buying sw2. We assume that the point of indifference between buying sw1
and buying sw2, denoted by θb1b 2 , lies somewhere between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 < θb1b 2 < 1 ).
(Without this assumption, buying either software would always dominate buying the other.)
Consider the consumer’s utility with respect to θ as shown in Figure 6. Namely,
there will be 4 groups of consumers. Those with θ ∈ [θb1b 2 ,1] would buy sw1 and those with

θ ∈ [θ p1b 2 ,θb1b 2 ] would buy sw2. Moreover, those with θ ∈ [θ p1 p 2 ,θ p1b 2 ] would choose to
pirate sw1 while those with θ ∈ [0,θ p1 p 2 ] (if (η1 ,η2 ) = (1, 0) and θ p1 p 2 > 0 ) would choose to
pirate sw2. However, we assume that even though sw2 is unprotected, it can only convert a
certain portion of consumers from pirating sw1 to pirating sw2, mainly because the pirating
cost should be relatively small. More formally, we assume the relations among the
intersecting points to satisfy the following:
1 > θb1b 2 > θ p1b 2 > θ p 2b 2 ∀ z ∈ [0,1]

….. (C2)
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Intuitively, it implies that the price of sw1 is higher than that of sw2 and both prices are higher
than the pirating cost. Also, the risk of using pirated software is more significant than the
quality difference between the products (i.e. q2 > (1 − φ )q1 such that U b 2 is always steeper
than U p 2 ).
Similar to our analysis on the horizontal differentiation case, the demands are given
by the corresponding projections of the utility planes onto the ( , z) plane, as illustrated by
the shaded areas in Figure 7. Namely, the demands for sw1 and sw2 are given by:
1

d1 = 1 − ∫ θb1b 2 dz = 1 −
0

1

1

0

0

p1 − p2
q1 − q2

d 2 = ∫ θ b1b 2 dz − ∫ θ p1b 2 dz =

….. (13)

p1 − p2 1 τη1 − 2 p2
+
q1 − q2 2 q1 (φ − 1) + q2

….. (14)

That is, the utility-maximizing demands would be entirely in terms of the other exogenous
model parameters q1 , q2 , φ , τ and k as well as the endogenous p1 , p2 , η1 and η2 . Since
firms need to determine optimal prices to maximize their profits, their problems would be:
max
p1

π1 =

max
p1

p1d1 − kη1 =

max ⎛
p1 − p2 ⎞
⎜1 −
⎟ p1 − kη1
p1 ⎝
q1 − q2 ⎠

….. (15)

max ⎛ p1 − p2 1 τη1 − 2 p2 ⎞
….. (16)
+
⎜
⎟ p − kη2
p2
p2
p2 ⎝ q1 − q2 2 q1 (φ − 1) + q2 ⎠ 2
Proposition 2 6 : In a vertically differentiated software market, non-protection would
always be optimal to the lower-quality firm. Protection would be optimal for the
max

π2 =

max

p2 d 2 − kη 2 =

τ (8q12φ + q1τ − 8q1q2φ − τ q2 )
higher-quality firm only if k < k =
.
4(q1 + 3q1φ − q2 ) 2
*

It is apparent that k * is always increasing in τ , the pirating cost. Protection would be
optimal only if the protection cost is below k * which mainly consists of a square term of the
pirating cost τ of the consumer. This once again suggests that firms should prefer only a
very simple and low-cost protection mechanism or no protection at all.
As shown in the Appendix, the optimal prices, demands as well as profits, if nonprotection strategy is adopted by both firms, would be:

6

p1* =

2q1φ (q1 − q2 )
q1 + 3q1φ − q2

d1* =

2q1φ
q1 + 3q1φ − q2

π 1* =

4q12φ 2 (q1 − q2 )
(q1 + 3q1φ − q2 ) 2

p2* =

(q1φ − q1 + q2 )(q1 − q2 )
q1 + 3q1φ − q2

d 2* =

q1φ
q1 + 3q1φ − q2

π 2* =

q1φ (q1φ − q1 + q2 )(q1 − q2 )
(q1 + 3q1φ − q2 ) 2

Proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward and withheld due to length limitation. Interested readers may obtain it from the

authors directly.
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In particular, the higher-quality firm would charge a higher price and the optimal profit of the
higher-quality firm is increasing in q1 just like the case of horizontal differentiation. The
optimal profit of the lower-quality firm is also increasing in φ . In case the higher-quality
firm chooses to protect, the optimal prices, demands as well as profits of the two firms would
become:
p1* =
π1* =

(4q1φ + τ )(q1 − q2 )
2(q1 + 3q1φ − q2 )

d1* =

1 4q1φ + τ
2 q1 + 3q1φ − q2

1
(16q13φ 2 + 8τ q12φ + q1τ 2 −16q1q2φ 2 − 8q1q2φτ − q2τ 2 − 4kq12 − 24kq12φ + 8kq1q2 − 36kq12φ 2 + 24kq1q2φ − 4kq22 )
2
(q1 + 3q1φ − q2 )

p2* =

(q1φ − q1 + q2 + τ )(q1 − q2 )
q1 + 3q1φ − q2

d 2* =

q1φ (q1φ − q1 + τ + q2 )
(q1φ − q1 + q2 )(q1 + 3q1φ − q2 )

q1φ (q1φ − q1 + τ + q2 ) 2 (q1 − q2 )
π =
(q1φ − q1 + q2 )(q1 + 3q1φ − q2 ) 2
*
2

Similar to the case of horizontal differentiation, it can be shown that the optimal
prices and demands for non-protection would always be lower than those if the higher quality
firm chooses to protect. Again, the protection cost should be the major determining factor for
the higher quality firm to choose protection. The effects of risk on the optimal price, demand
as well as profit can be seen from the following table of comparative statics:
∂p1*
∂p2*
∂d1*
∂d 2*
∂π 1*
∂π 2*
∂φ
∂φ
∂φ
∂φ
∂φ
∂φ
Only Firm 1 Protect
+′′
+′′
+′′
−′′
+′′
+′′
Both Not Protect
+
+
+
+
+
+
+′′: positive if τ <

4(q1 − q2 )
3

−′′: negative if τ <

4(q1 − q2 )
3

Namely, optimal prices, demands and profits would all increase with risk if both firms choose
the non-protection strategy. In case the higher quality firm chooses to protect, the optimal
prices and profits would still increase with risk 7 but the optimal demand for the lower quality
product would decrease. Intuitively, a higher risk would lead to a higher demand for the
higher quality product but that would essentially reduce the demand of the lower quality
product, although it would still result in an increased profit for the lower quality firm due to
the increased price.
5.

Discussion
We have considered the optimal protection strategies under two different types of
market differentiations. Our analysis shows that in a vertically differentiated market the
lower-quality firm would always prefer non-protection. Furthermore, protection would be

7

We mainly consider the case when τ < (4/3)(q1 −q2) because the pirating cost should be significantly lower than the

benefits of software in order for people to consider pirating.
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profit-maximizing only if the implementation cost is low. In reality, we observe that most
software developers are still implementing some sort of protection mechanisms in their
software products although strong externalities effects are quite universal in the widelyexpanded software business nowadays. Apparently this seems to be inconsistent with the
findings from previous researches (Conner & Rumelt 1991; Shy & Thisse 1999). It is also
interesting to note that complicated protection mechanisms are seldom found nowadays.
Most software products just employ a simple product key code validation or registration
process to guard against unauthorized usage. The duplicated uses of those product key codes
are seldom really checked, nor would they prevent the actual usage of the software. The
software protection mechanisms used nowadays are observed to be converging to a very
simple and common form of product key code validation. It is reasonable to expect that this
sort of mechanisms would not be very costly to implement and is likely to be reusable on
other software products developed by the same firm, further lowering the average
implementation cost of protection.
Anecdotal evidence supports some of our findings. For instance, Maplesoft’s Maple
and Wolfram’s Mathematica can be regarded as two horizontally differentiated products
competing in the area of symbolic computation software. They are two incompatible products
with different sets of features and employ different file formats although their problem
domains are similar. Both of them adopt a simple product key code validation mechanism for
protection. It is interesting to find that apart from protection strategy, their listed prices are
also very similar. These facts are consistent with our analytical findings.
On the other hand, the Microsoft Office suite and Sun Microsystems’ StarOffice
package can be regarded as examples of vertically differentiated products. As Microsoft
Office has become a de facto standard in the office productivity area, competitors in this
application area have to develop products that are compatible with it. Unfortunately,
Microsoft Office has been adopting a proprietary file format that prevents others from
producing compatible products. StarOffice actually originated from an open- source initiative
that attempted to reverse-engineer the proprietary file formats used by Microsoft Office that
was believed to be over-priced. As a result, StarOffice is able to read and produce documents
and spreadsheets in Microsoft Office format. However, it never achieves full compatibility
with Microsoft Office and users may perceive it as a lower-quality product in this sense.
Interestingly, Microsoft Office is adopting a protection scheme while StarOffice is not.
Again, this is consistent with our analytical findings.
6.

Conclusion and Future Work
Our findings show that the primary consideration of software protection strategies
should be the implementation cost. This may help explain why complicated protection
mechanisms have mostly been driven out of the software market nowadays. Also, the
software developer of the lower-quality product would tend to adopt non-protection in order
to compete with the higher-quality product in a vertically differentiated market. We have
also considered the effects of risk in using pirated software. In either horizontally
differentiated or vertically differentiated markets, a firm’s profit is found to be increasing
with the risk of using pirated software 8. More interestingly, one may find that risk has a
similar positive effect on profit as product quality.
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the existence of risk in itself does not
prevent the use of pirated software. However, consumers are deterred from doing so in view
8

If protection is chosen, this is subject to some technical constraints regarding the pirating cost τ.
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of the uncertainty introduced by the risk. Gopal & Sanders (1997) showed that deterrent
measures would be more profit-maximizing than preventive ones for dealing with software
piracy. Our findings about the effect of risk also support this argument. We attribute one of
the sources of the risk in using pirated software to the unavailability of technical support.
However, it should be noted that in this study we do not assume risk to be a parameter
controllable by firm. In real life, the risk in using pirated software is subject to many other
factors beyond the control of the software firm. We believe that firms can actually affect at
least two factors: the reliability of software product and the quality of technical support.
Ironically, the value of technical support increases when the reliability of software decreases.
It would be interesting to see how these two factors (i.e. reliability and technical support
quality) would interact and affect the firm’s optimal strategy. We believe that future
extension of this study can be developed along this line.
Our analysis does not consider the effect of externalities. Intuitively, firms should
merely have less incentive to protect their software if there are strong externalities effects.
However, empirical observation shows that most software products are still implementing
protection mechanisms, albeit only simple and low-cost ones. In this study, we mainly focus
on the effects of protection costs and risk in a competitive market. It would actually be
straightforward to extend our model to include externalities effects as well. This could be
another possible extension of this work.
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